中美沖突：1%階層和99%階層訴求完全不同

觀察者網(wǎng)全文翻譯：

    美國(guó)商務(wù)部上周公布的貿(mào)易數(shù)據(jù)顯示，雖然較上月略有收縮，但十月份的對(duì)華貿(mào)易逆差仍舊十分龐大。這個(gè)數(shù)據(jù)預(yù)示著，美國(guó)將對(duì)中國(guó)進(jìn)行新一輪的強(qiáng)有力的經(jīng)濟(jì)干預(yù)。

不幸的是，對(duì)中國(guó)問(wèn)題的辯論往往陷入剪不清、理還亂的境地，因而沒(méi)有形成有效的措施。造成這種混亂的一個(gè)主要原因是，美國(guó)沒(méi)有一個(gè)真正針對(duì)中國(guó)的普遍利益訴求點(diǎn)。美國(guó)99%的階層對(duì)華主張完全異于那些1%階層。除非雙方在這個(gè)問(wèn)題上達(dá)成共識(shí)，否則對(duì)華經(jīng)濟(jì)關(guān)系將不會(huì)得到改善，龐大的工人階級(jí)也不會(huì)受益。

對(duì)華政策的核心焦點(diǎn)是人民幣升值問(wèn)題。這種對(duì)美元的過(guò)高估值是中國(guó)毫不掩飾的讓人民幣匯率與美元掛鉤的結(jié)果。

中國(guó)政府常常被指責(zé)操縱匯率，但基于以下兩個(gè)事實(shí)，這種指責(zé)根本站不住腳。首先，這是一項(xiàng)官方政策，中國(guó)政府在調(diào)整匯率時(shí)相當(dāng)透明，而非在半夜無(wú)人時(shí)悄悄出手。

其次，目前中國(guó)管理匯率的機(jī)制是，美國(guó)財(cái)政部一旦采取行動(dòng)，中國(guó)政府隔日就會(huì)推出相應(yīng)措施，比如大筆購(gòu)入美國(guó)國(guó)債。
這似乎很荒謬，但卻是事實(shí)。中國(guó)保持其貨幣匯率的穩(wěn)定是通過(guò)購(gòu)買美國(guó)政府的巨額國(guó)債來(lái)實(shí)現(xiàn)的。

媒體天天在說(shuō)，我們需要中國(guó)購(gòu)買我們的債務(wù)。這是不正確的。其實(shí)還有許多其他潛在投資者，比如美國(guó)聯(lián)邦儲(chǔ)備委員會(huì)。然而，我們不能一邊指望中國(guó)購(gòu)買美國(guó)國(guó)債，一邊又抱怨中國(guó)操縱貨幣。但這的確是他們操縱人民幣的方式。

當(dāng)前的問(wèn)題是，只有很少一部分人對(duì)中國(guó)本身不滿。大部分人是對(duì)中國(guó)不尊重輝瑞制藥和迪斯尼之類公司的專利和版權(quán)的行為不滿，對(duì)中國(guó)不準(zhǔn)予像美林和高盛這樣的金融巨頭在中國(guó)全面開(kāi)放市場(chǎng)不滿，對(duì)中國(guó)為沃爾瑪這樣的想要把店開(kāi)到中國(guó)各地的零售連鎖店設(shè)置很多障礙不滿。而這些往往與人民幣被低估混為一談，從而制造一些經(jīng)濟(jì)控告，反對(duì)中國(guó)政府。

人們可以爭(zhēng)辯以上事情孰輕孰重，然而卻對(duì)現(xiàn)實(shí)毫無(wú)幫助。沒(méi)有一個(gè)法庭可以用來(lái)控訴中國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)行為。中國(guó)是一個(gè)強(qiáng)盛的國(guó)家，它的GDP接近美國(guó)的80%。而蘇聯(lián)的GDP在鼎盛時(shí)期也不過(guò)是美國(guó)的一半。

我們永遠(yuǎn)不打算對(duì)中國(guó)發(fā)號(hào)施令，告訴它什么該做，什么不該做。我們會(huì)像他們那樣平等地進(jìn)行談判。這意味著，要從中國(guó)政府那里得到一些特許，我們必須在別的問(wèn)題上作出讓步。

從這個(gè)角度看，那些對(duì)中國(guó)剽竊輝瑞和迪斯尼的知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)大呼小叫的人堅(jiān)決反對(duì)那些擔(dān)心人民幣被低估的人。如果中國(guó)作出一些讓步，同意加強(qiáng)鞏固美國(guó)專利和版權(quán)，那么它在提升貨幣價(jià)值方面幾乎不會(huì)讓步。同樣，如果中國(guó)給予美林和高盛在金融方面更多的權(quán)力，就要對(duì)美元重新進(jìn)行評(píng)估。

關(guān)鍵是，與中國(guó)談判時(shí)，奧巴馬政府將偏袒某些利益而不顧對(duì)他人的損害。而工人階級(jí)在美元貶值方面有一個(gè)明確的利益訴求。

如果美元相對(duì)于人民幣貶值20%，進(jìn)口中國(guó)商品強(qiáng)加20%關(guān)稅與出口分發(fā)20%的津貼將產(chǎn)生大約同樣的影響。美元貶值很有希望擊敗其他貨幣，這樣大大有助于減少貿(mào)易逆差，創(chuàng)造數(shù)以百萬(wàn)計(jì)相對(duì)較高收入的制造業(yè)就業(yè)機(jī)會(huì)。

相比之下，如果中國(guó)加強(qiáng)鞏固輝瑞和迪斯尼的專利和版權(quán)，他們將會(huì)得到更高的利潤(rùn)，但美國(guó)的工人們就幾乎得不到什么益處了。

簡(jiǎn)而言之，中美談判存在一個(gè)非常明晰的階級(jí)劃分。1%的階層關(guān)注是否會(huì)讓他們更富有。99%的階層則關(guān)心貨幣貶值可以為他們創(chuàng)造數(shù)以百萬(wàn)計(jì)的制造業(yè)就業(yè)機(jī)會(huì)。我們想要看看，奧巴馬政府到底站在哪一邊。

美國(guó)讀者相關(guān)評(píng)論：

評(píng)論1：老實(shí)說(shuō)，中美貿(mào)易，我看不到美國(guó)占到什么優(yōu)勢(shì)。甚至當(dāng)我假裝思考美國(guó)本身利益時(shí)，我仍想不出什么辦法。底線是，中國(guó)廉價(jià)的制造業(yè)在未來(lái)數(shù)十年仍將繼續(xù)，如果不能長(zhǎng)久就另當(dāng)別論。你的服務(wù)業(yè)既不能彌補(bǔ)這種差距，也不能彌補(bǔ)你的高科技行業(yè)。如果美國(guó)是一個(gè)小國(guó)家，需要較少的制造業(yè)，你也許會(huì)像韓國(guó)、日本那樣還有盈余，可惜你不是。中國(guó)和他的政府國(guó)家利益至上。他不會(huì)浮動(dòng)他的貨幣匯率。這會(huì)對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)企業(yè)有利。外部的人什么都做不了。不，你沒(méi)有發(fā)起嚴(yán)重的關(guān)稅或啟動(dòng)任何一種與世界上最大的的制造商和消費(fèi)市場(chǎng)的貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的政治動(dòng)力。

所以，只會(huì)讓情況越來(lái)越糟，也只能忍著。

評(píng)論2：誰(shuí)設(shè)置的貨幣匯率？我們?yōu)槭裁床荒芑氐竭^(guò)去的黃金標(biāo)準(zhǔn)呢？由于這些不公平的自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定，我們已經(jīng)失去了我們?cè)诿绹?guó)的制造基地。國(guó)會(huì)應(yīng)該通過(guò)法律支持當(dāng)?shù)氐纳a(chǎn)商并鼓勵(lì)國(guó)內(nèi)的制造業(yè)。

評(píng)論3：雖然我同意貝克博士在這個(gè)問(wèn)題上關(guān)于政治力量和交易的描述，但我不同意對(duì)美國(guó)政府替代債權(quán)人的有效性這種相對(duì)草率的論述：

“還有許多其他潛在投資者，包括美國(guó)聯(lián)邦儲(chǔ)備委員會(huì)。”

把中國(guó)政府從這個(gè)債務(wù)市場(chǎng)排除在外，將：

1.立即抬高基準(zhǔn)利率

2.立即抬高政府的其他預(yù)算赤字

但因?yàn)檫@樣一種措施沒(méi)有將中國(guó)從美國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)的其他領(lǐng)域排除出去，中國(guó)仍然可以有效地通過(guò)將流通中的美元轉(zhuǎn)移到資本市場(chǎng)的其他領(lǐng)域來(lái)實(shí)現(xiàn)美元和人民幣的掛鉤。這樣會(huì)導(dǎo)致如下結(jié)果：

1、美國(guó)債券違約保險(xiǎn)費(fèi)（財(cái)政部和“風(fēng)險(xiǎn)”債券之間的收益差）減少；

2、股權(quán)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)溢價(jià)減少；

3、中國(guó)政府在市政債券違約事件中的影響增強(qiáng)；

4、身份感和對(duì)美國(guó)企業(yè)的控制增強(qiáng)；

這就是問(wèn)題所在：

中美外匯率對(duì)刺激美國(guó)制造業(yè)尋求復(fù)興的渴望正如貝克博士預(yù)測(cè)的并沒(méi)有明顯改變。

評(píng)論4：奧巴馬的嘴向著99%的階層，但他的行動(dòng)（和米歇爾計(jì)劃一樣）則是向著頂端的1%階層。

從中國(guó)到歐洲再到美國(guó)，將會(huì)有一個(gè)全球性的抗議活動(dòng)反對(duì)1%的精英階層，它將會(huì)使歐債危機(jī)和美債危機(jī)像之前歷史上的危機(jī)一樣更令人擔(dān)憂。

評(píng)論5：我認(rèn)為這種說(shuō)法是有問(wèn)題的，如果人民幣升值，中國(guó)的出口商就只能自付增加的成本（接受更低的利潤(rùn)率）以保持其市場(chǎng)份額。此外，如果中國(guó)人由于人民幣升值（或者增加勞動(dòng)力成本）而失去一些工作機(jī)會(huì)，這些工作機(jī)會(huì)將轉(zhuǎn)移到亞洲其他低工資的國(guó)家，如越南、孟加拉，甚至?xí)侥鞲纭Ｔ絹?lái)越多的美國(guó)公司選擇墨西哥，甚至多于選擇中國(guó)，很大一部分原因就是因?yàn)楹Ｉ线\(yùn)輸成本的上升。

此外，中國(guó)的工作崗位，很大一部分是由低技術(shù)，低附加值被低教育程度的人群（中國(guó)工廠里的女孩，來(lái)自農(nóng)村的中國(guó)移民）所從事。這些工作機(jī)會(huì)現(xiàn)在或者將來(lái)都不能回到美國(guó)本土。這是很難的工作，往往需要美國(guó)的中產(chǎn)階級(jí)來(lái)做，即使他們最終會(huì)在這里。

評(píng)論6：你不能否認(rèn)存在一個(gè)市場(chǎng) “鐵腕”…….消費(fèi)者總是購(gòu)買他們感覺(jué)有“價(jià)值”的東西。

貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)不會(huì)停止，永遠(yuǎn)不會(huì)！

根據(jù)消費(fèi)者和市場(chǎng)份額來(lái)看，我們的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手生產(chǎn)大部分制成品，他們比美國(guó)做的更好。在奧巴馬大蕭條時(shí)期很難有利潤(rùn)！！！

即使在社會(huì)主義，利潤(rùn)/中央經(jīng)濟(jì)利潤(rùn)也必須被兌現(xiàn)。奧巴馬就是個(gè)騙子。

    英文如下：

Economic Conflicts With China and Class War in the United States

The Commerce Department's release of trade figures last week showed another large deficit with China for October, albeit slightly lower than the record hit the previous month. This figure will renew the calls for stronger action against China.

Unfortunately the debate over China is often buried in confusion, leading to a situation that is not conducive to effective action. A major reason for this confusion is that there is not a common U.S. interest against China. The interests of the 99 percent differ greatly from the interests of the 1 percent. Until this fact is recognized more generally, there is no possibility that our economic relations with China will change in a way that benefits the vast majority of working people in the United States.

The central issue with China is the fact that the dollar is over-valued against the Chinese currency. This over-valuation is the result of the explicit Chinese policy of pegging its currency against the dollar.

The peg is often referred to as "manipulation," but it doesn't really fit the bill for two reasons. First, it is an official policy. China targets the value of its currency quite openly; it is not doing it in the middle of the night when no one is looking.

The second reason is that China's mechanism for targeting the value of its currency is something that on alternate days our Treasury actually requests. They buy up U.S. government debt.
If this seems absurd, it should because it is. The way in which China keeps its currency down against the dollar (or keeps the dollar up against its currency) is by buying huge amounts of U.S. government bonds.

The media often tells us that we need China to buy our debt. This is not true. There are plenty of other potential investors, including the Federal Reserve Board. However we cannot both want China to buy U.S. government debt and then complain about China's currency manipulation. This is how they "manipulate" their currency.

But the currency issue is only one of many complaints that routinely appear in the list of grievances against China. The longer list includes complaints that China doesn't respect the patents and copyrights of companies like Pfizer and Disney, they don't grant full access to financial giants like Merrill Lynch and Goldman Sachs, and they put up barriers to retail chains like Wal-Mart who want to open up stores across China. These sorts of items are often lumped together with the undervaluation of the Chinese yuan to make a sort of economic indictment against the Chinese government.
One can argue the merits of each of these issues, but that doesn't have anything to do with the real world. There is no court where we are going to prosecute China for its economic wrongdoing. China is a huge powerful country. Its GDP is nearly 80 percent of U.S. GDP. By comparison, at its peak the GDP of the Soviet Union may have been half as large as the GDP of the United States.

We are not ever going to be in a situation to dictate to China what it can and cannot do. We are going to have to negotiate with them as the equal that they are. This means that in order to get some concessions from China's government on issues that we care about we will have to give up on other issues.

From this standpoint, the interests of those yelling about China's "pirating" of Pfizer and Disney's intellectual property are 180 degrees at odds with those concerned about the undervaluation of the yuan. If China gives up some ground in agreeing to stronger enforcement of U.S. patents and copyrights, then it is going to give up less ground in agreeing to raise the value of its currency. Similarly, if China agrees to give Merrill Lynch and Goldman Sachs more access to its financial sector, it will be at the cost of progress on revaluing its currency.

The point is that in pushing various demands in its negotiations with China, the Obama administration will be favoring certain interests to the detriment of others. The bulk of the working population has a clear interest in having a lower valued dollar.

If the dollar falls by 20 percent relative to the yuan, this would have roughly the same impact as imposing a 20 percent tariff on importing Chinese goods and giving out a 20 percent subsidy on exports to subsidy. Since the dollar is likely to fall against other currencies as well, this could go far toward bringing down the trade deficit, creating millions of relatively high-paying manufacturing jobs.

By contrast, Pfizer and Disney will see higher profits if China's increases enforcement of their patents and copyrights, but this will provide little benefit to workers in the United States. Similarly, Goldman Sach's increased access to China's financial markets is not going to create jobs for workers in the United States.

In short, there is a very clear class divide in U.S. negotiations with China. The 1 percent have their laundry list of special concerns that will make them even richer. The 99 percent care about a lower-valued currency to create millions of manufacturing jobs. We will see which side the Obama administration is on.

相關(guān)評(píng)論：

1、Honestly, I see no way for the US to win in terms of trade with China. Even when I pretend to think in American interests, I can find no solution. The bottom line is that China will have cheaper manufactur­ing for decades to come, if not longer. Your service sector won't make up for the discrepanc­y, nor your tech sectors. If the US was a smaller country that required less manufactur­ing you might be able to win a surplus like Korea/Japa­n does, but you're not. Yes, China and its government has national interest at heart. It will not float its currency. It WILL favor domestic enterprise­s. There's nothing anyone on the outside can do about it. No, you don't have the political impetus to initiate serious tariffs or start any kind of trade war with the world's largest manufactur­er and consumer market.

So, too bad, live with it.

2、Who sets the rate of currency? Why don't we go back to the good old Gold Standard ? We have lost our manufactur­ing base in USA because of these unfair free trade agreements Congress should pass laws to favor local producers and encourage domestic manufactur­ing.

3、While I agree with Dr. Baker's descriptio¬n of the political forces and trade-offs on this matter, I respective¬ly disagree with this relatively cavalier statement regarding the availabili¬ty of alternate creditors for the US government¬:

"There are plenty of other potential investors, including the Federal Reserve Board."

Excluding the Chinese government from participat¬ing in this debt market will

(a) immediatel¬y drive up baseline interest rates, and

(b) immediatel¬y drive up other government¬'s budget deficit.

But because such a measure does not exclude China from participat¬ing in other areas of the US capital market, China could still effectivel¬y peg its currency to the US dollar by shifting its flow of dollars into these other areas of that market. Such a response would result in:

1) a decrease in US bond default premiums (the yield spreads between Treasury and 'risky' bonds)

2) a decrease in the equity risk premium (the difference in the implied discount rates for equity versus Treasury securities¬),

3) increased influence by the Chinese government in the event of municipal bond defaults,

4) increased ownership and control of US firms, and

And this is the problem:

5) no appreciabl¬e change in the US-China foreign exchange rate to spur the much desired renaissanc¬e in the US manufactur¬ing sector that Dr. Baker predicts.

4、Obama's mouth will be for the 99% and his actions (and Michelle's holiday plans) will be with the top 1% of the 1%.

There is going to be a global revolt from China to Europe to America against the top 1% and it will make concerns over currency and Euro debt look like the good old days.

5、I think there are problems with this argument. If the Yuan increases in value, Chinese exporters will simply eat some of the increased costs (and accept lower profit margins) to maintain their market shares. Also, if the Chinese do lose some of these jobs because of a rising Yuan ( or rising labor costs), many of these jobs will simply move to other low wage platforms in Asia, such as Vietnam or Bangladesh­, or to Mexico. Many American firms are increasing­ly choosing Mexico over China for production purposes for a number of reasons, including the rising cost of transporta­tion by sea.

Also, the jobs in question in China are largely low skilled, low value added jobs performed by workers with very little education (Chinese factory girls, Chinese migrants from the countrysid­e). These jobs are not coming back to U.S. soil, now or in the future. And these are hardly jobs that would allow an American to join the Middle Class, even if they did end up here.

6、You cannot deny the "Iron Hand" of Markets...­..........­.....consu­mers always buy what they
percieve as "Value" !

Trade Wars never work, ever !

Our Competitor­s do a better Job of most manufactur­ed goods than the USA, according to consumers and Market Shares. Hard to make a Profit in the OBAMA DEPRESSION ! ! !
Profits must be honored even in Socialist/­Central Economies. Obama is a Fraud !

原文鏈接：http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dean-baker/economic-conflicts-with-c_b_1144116.html